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RECENT CASES
DIVORCE-MODIFICATION' OF CUSTODY DECREE#
That the welfare of the child should be the paramount concern of
the court in determining custodial rights of parents in divorce proceedings is undisputed. However, the Florida Supreme Court, in a recent
case' ignored fundamental law where on the record it clearly appeared
that the interest of the child would be best served with the mother.
The facts briefly are these: the mother was successful plaintiff in a
divorce action and the decree, in which the custody of the five year old
daughter was divided between the contestants, was entered in April
1944. Two subsequent modifications in the custodial decree were made,
the last oil September 10th, 1945 when permanent custory was awarded
to the father, with the right of 30 day visitation each year reserved
to the mother. Iln July 1947, the mother petitioned for the permanent
custodv of the child on the basis of the following undisputed facts:
that, whereas she was formerly unable to provide a permanent home
for the child, her present husband then being a member of the F.B.I.
with no pernanent station, is now practicing law with his father in
the City of Detroit. and is permanently settled there. They own their

own home, and are financially and otherwise able and anxious to rear
the child, and can offer it proper home environment, cultural and educational advantages.
The Hon. Erniest Mason, the very same judge who entered the decree
oi September 10th, 1945, heard testimony, observed the witnesses and
found that the conditions of the parties had changed sufficiently for an
exercise of his judicial discretion to modify the decree. He found, inter
alia, that the mother could devote her full time to the child; that the
father and his present wife are both employed and have little time to
dedicate to the child. He found that while the legal custody was in
the father, the actual custody was in the 73 year old paternal grandmother. In view of these facts, Judge Mason modified the decree of
September 1945 and awarded the eight year old girl to her mother with
a 30 day right of visitation to the father. On appeal, the Supreme

Court reversed the modifying decree on two main grounds. The first
of these grounds was that, "the same degree of discretion does not rest

in the chancellor to modify custodial provisions of divorce decree as is
reposed lin him to enter original decree.'' 2

Vith this there can be no quarrel. Certain it is that rights of indivi ultals, once ascertained and judicially declared, should not be subjetct to the varying winds of chance and differences in judicial thought

* Belford v. Belford, 32 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 1947).
See note * supra.
2See Note * aupra.
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and opinion. This is especially important with respect to custodial
law. Children, particularly those of tender years, should not be buffeted about like a chattel with the net result that they becon.e rmaladjusted, unstable citizens, and oftimes delinquent. 3 But this is rnot to saY
that circumstances camot so arise and be such as to warrant or V-T.i
demand a modification.
As early as 1882 our Florida courts held in a divorce case, the court
exercises disrretion in the chancery award of custody of minor children
of the parties, reserving the power to open, alter and modify the decree
in such respect from time to time.) Judgments respecting custody of
children in divorce cases are necessarily provisional and temporary and
ordinarily not res judic6ta in same court except as to facts before court
at time of judgment.5 There can be no question to-day but, that the
father has no right of custody superior to that of the mother.A
The other basis for reversal was that as a matter of law "there are
no sufficient changes in the circumstances of the parties to warrant the
changes and modifications intended to be made by the decree from which
this appeal is taken.'' 7 In other words the chancellor abused his right
of discretion.
Just what facts are necessary to be adduced that the court would
consider sufficient? What further convincing proof could be desired
if the guiding principle incustodial cases, is the "welfare of the child" ?'
Ceteris paribus, which parent, if any, has or should have ;I superior
right? The modern social thought, and most recent legal expression.
as well as statutory enactments, support the natural law . . . giving
preference as to rights of custody to the mother. Justice Terrell of the
Florida Supreme Court, in his usual well expressed manner, in Randolph
v. Randolph, 9 said "So the ultimate test of guardianship in this state is
spiritual and moral well-being of the child. . . If there was ever a
reason among civilized people why a father should have right over the
mother to the guardianship of a minor child, I am unable to define
it. . . . She toyed with her own life to bring it into existence, and if
not totally bereft of the attributes of motherhood, she is morally,
spiritually and biologically, best suited to care for it during infancy and
adolescence. . . . In civilized society, rlo calling rises above that of
motherhood and in the care of minor children, she makes her most
abiding impression. In this the father is by nature a poor second."
Should the fact that the decree of September 1945 used the word
"permaneint" as to the custody, and failed to expressly reserve the
Court's continuing jurisdiction which the earlier modified decrees
contained, raise an insuriountitable barrier to modification? \Ve think
3 For an excellent article see "Custody Incident to Divorce in Flnrhua."
2 Miami Law Quarterly 32.
4 McGill v. McGill, 19 Fla. 341 (1882).
i Miniek v. Minick, 111 Fla: 469, 149 So. 483 (1933).
( Randolph v. Ra-ndolph, 148 lO. 491, 1 So. 2d 480 (1941).
7 See Note *,supra.
Stewart v. Stewart, 156 Fla. 815, 24 So. 2d 529 (1946).
';
See Note 6, supra.

MlIAMI L.ilt" QUART'ERLY
not.

[Vol. 2

Mlinor children remain at all times wards of the Court, in

custody proceedings.
It appears most inequitable that the mother was not at least granted
:4 more f.'Vorable decree, say a three months period of visitation. She is
L-titled to enjoy her society for a reasonably sufficient time each year
to enable her to inculcate in her mind a spirit of love, affection and

respect for her mother.' 0

Courts being jealous of their jurisdiction, one wonders if the same
result would have been reached had the mother remained domiciled in
Florida rather than Michigan. In any event, the decision in the instant
case is at variance with the great weight of authority, and cannot be
reconciled with earlier Florida cases. It certainly is not in accord with
modern social doctrines.
I0 Frazier v, Frazier, 109 Fla. 164, 147 So. 464 (1933).
Where evidence
showed neither of divorced parents had superior qualifications for exercising parental rights, modifying decree awarding custody of 11 year
old female child so as to exclude father except for two weeks each year
held erroneous in not permitting father child's custody for not less than
three months.

TAXATION-LAND EXEMPT WHERE NO
BENEFITS RECEIVED5
The Florida Supreme Court recently held that where agricultural
lands included within municipal boundaries receive no benefits, direct
or indirect, from the municipality other than from its water works, the
enforcement of municipal taxes on the lands other than for debt service
on the water works bonds may be enjoined. 1
The effect of the principal case is that agricultural lands within a
municipality are taxable only if, and to the extent that, they receive
municipal benefits. This is presumably based on the minority rule that
municipal taxation of property which cannot be benefited by municipal
expenditures is a taking of private property for public purposes and may
be enjoined. 2 In two of the small minority of states recognizing this
theory it has been overruled as unsatisfactory and impracticable) As
was pointed out in a New Jersey case,* "If the matter of benefits to the
* Town of Lake Hamilton v. Hughes, 32 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 1947).
ISee Note*, supra.
2 Langworthy v. Dubuque 16 Iowa 271 (1864); Territory v. Daniels
6 Utah 288, 22 Pac. 159, 5 L.R.A. 444 (1889) since overruled see (before
constitution adopted) Kimball v. Grantsville City, 19 Utah 368, 398, 57
Pae. 1, 45 L.R.A. 628 (1899); Town of Parkland v. Gaines, Same v.
Drown, 88 Ky. 562, 11 SW 649 (1889) since overruled see Hughes v.
Carl et. at., 106 Ky. 533, 50 SW 852 (1899); Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa
A2 1859).
3 Kimball v. Grantsville City, supra. Hughes v. Carl, supra.
I state (Bailey. Prosecutor) v. Brown, Collector, 53 N.J.L. 182, 20
AtI. 772 (1890).

